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MANAGING AFRICA’S VIOLENT CONFLICTS 
 
by Richard Jackson 
 
Conflict management research has not often compared the effectiveness of different methods 
such as negotiation and mediation. Consequently, applying conflict management techniques 
to international disputes has sometimes been ad hoc and ineffectual. This article compares the 
effectiveness of negotiation and mediation in African conflict management in the period 1945 
to 1995. Utilizing an original data set on cases of negotiation and mediation, the analysis 
indicates that, overall, bilateral negotiations are more successful than mediation. However, 
negotiation is difficult to initiate in cases of intense, intractable civil conflicts, and works best 
in cases of interstate disputes. Given that Africa‘s worst conflicts are all intense, long-running 
civil wars, improving the effectiveness of mediation in the region is a top priority. 
 
Following World War II, the desire to limit the destructive effects of international conflict 
culminated in the UN Declaration. Apart from charging the Security Council with the 
maintenance of international peace using ―any means,‖ article 33 (1) of the Charter says that 
―the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or by other means of their own choice.‖ The concern of the UN framers for 
international conflict management, and the efforts of diplomats in the intervening years, are 
belied by the rather patchy record of success. Since World War II, between fifteen and thirty 
million people have perished as a direct result of more than eighty major wars.
1
 In the vast 
majority of these conflicts, efforts to settle or manage them have usually been ad hoc, 
uncoordinated, poorly planned, and largely ineffective. 
 
For example, at the height of the Zairean conflict in late 1996 and early 1997, there were no 
less than four separate conflict management efforts in progress. In the first place, Laurent 
Kabila‘s Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Zaire-Congo (ADFL) were attempting to 
open bilateral negotiations with President Mobutu Sese Seko‘s senior officials; those offers 
were rejected until May 1997 when Kabila‘s ADFL forces were about to overrun Kinshasa, 
Zaire‘s capital city. By this stage, of course, Kabila had no need to negotiate. 
 
The second main approach to managing this conflict came from surrounding heads of state, 
who were, unsurprisingly, concerned about the prospect of a country of more than forty 
million people imploding just across their extremely porous borders. Consequently, a series 
of ministerial-level, multiparty conferences were organised. On each occasion, parties whose 
participation was crucial to the talks failed to arrive, and little, if anything, was achieved. 
 
Another approach came via the United Nations‘ proposal for a military-led humanitarian 
intervention aimed at providing a buffer zone between the warring factions, and ensuring 
refugee safety, food distribution, and eventually, refugee repatriation. However, events on the 
ground, combined with vacillation and delay from important parties such as the United States 
and the UN Security Council, saw the intervention force disbanded before it was fully 
organised. The most notable aspect of this particular effort was the delicate tightrope walk by 
international diplomats, who wanted to avoid both the shame of being seen to be doing 
nothing, as in Rwanda in 1994, and the humiliation of failure, such as occurred in Somalia in 
1995. 
 
The last effort to solve the Zairean conflict was a series of mediations. In an unprecedented, 
joint peace mission, the United Nations and the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) sent a 
special envoy, Mohammed Sahnoun. Then President Nelson Mandela of South Africa 
attempted to mediate. Neither Sahnoun nor Mandela was able to bring about a much-needed 
respite in the fighting, or even move the parties towards more dialogue. 
 
In the end, Kabila took control of the whole of Zaire and renamed it the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC). No one knows how many people died in the conflict, but the number is 
likely to be in the hundreds of thousands. The United Nations abandoned an investigation in 
May 1998 into the whereabouts of an estimated 250,000 Hutu refugees who disappeared in 
eastern Zaire in the wake of the ADFL advance. It is likely that many of them were killed in 
retaliation for the 1994 genocide, probably by Tutsi troops from the Rwandan army who were 
fighting alongside the ADFL. In any case, the vast numbers of refugees, the general upheaval, 
and the regional instability caused by the conflict warranted a more coherent and forceful 
conflict management strategy than the ad hoc and piecemeal efforts accorded it. 
 
POSING THE PROBLEM 
 
The dilemmas posed by this example highlight one of the central problems confronting 
policymakers interested in managing violent international conflicts, namely, which method 
would be the most effective for solving this type of conflict. In the case of Zaire, should the 
international community have gone ahead with the humanitarian intervention? Would such an 
intervention have provided the optimal environment for a cessation of violence and eventual 
reconciliation of the warring factions? Or, should greater efforts have been made to bring 
together all of the interested parties in a roundtable conference? On the other side of the coin, 
should the principal parties—the Mobutu regime and Kabila‘s ADFL—have been more 
forcefully encouraged to sort it out between themselves? Did the conflict require a bilateral 
solution to ensure a lasting peace? Or, should mediation have come sooner and from a more 
forceful source, such as France or the United States? 
 
In short, policymakers need to know which method of conflict management—negotiation, 
mediation, multiparty conferences, or humanitarian intervention—is most likely to be 
successful in any given type of conflict situation. The confusion over matching appropriate 
interventions to conflicts is not limited to this conflict alone, however. It has been a constant 
feature of the post-war period, and an even greater problem in the post–cold war era, when 
the predominant form of international conflict changed from primarily interstate disputes to 
intractable, often ethnically motivated intrastate conflicts.
2
 The problem is particularly acute 
in Africa. 
 
CONFLICT IN AFRICA 
 
Even the most cursory glance at Africa‘s violent conflicts provides striking evidence of how 
complex and intractable many of them are.
3
 In the first instance, a careful examination of all 
the world‘s interstate conflicts and internationalised civil wars from 1945 to 1995 reveals that 
the African region has been the most conflict-prone, experiencing 79 out of 295 violent 
conflicts (26.7 percent).
4
 These conflicts are listed in Appendix 1. Furthermore, the African 
region had the highest number of civil conflicts (36), and the second-highest number of 
interstate conflicts (43), behind the Middle East (51).
5
  
 
Table 1 describes the most costly and intractable of Africa‘s conflicts and highlights some of 
the key characteristics of international conflict in Africa. Africa‘s conflicts tend to be more 
severe and more costly in terms of lives than conflicts in other regions. Only the conflicts in 
Indochina compare in severity to Africa‘s conflicts. A third of Africa‘s conflicts involved 
more than 10,000 deaths, and in total an estimated seven million people have lost their lives 
as a result of war in Africa since 1945. Between two and four million died during the period 
from 1980 to 1995 alone.
6
 
 
Table 1. 
 
Africa’s Worst Conflicts, 1945–Present 
Conflict Name  Dates 
 
Estimated 
Fatalities 
 
Intervening 
Parties 
 
Congo Conflict 1960–65 110,000 UN force, USA, 
Soviet Union, 
Belgium 
 
African 
Territories–Portugal 
 
1961–75 100,000+ South Africa, 
Rhodesia, Zambia, 
Zaire 
 
Eritrea–Ethiopia 1965–93 450,000–1 million Soviet Union, Italy, 
China, Libya, 
Sudan, Somalia 
 
Nigeria–Biafra 1967–70 1 million+ Britain, France, 
Soviet Union 
 
Angolan Conflict 1975–present 300,000–500,000 Soviet Union, 
Cuba, South Africa, 
USA, Zaire 
 
Mozambique 
Conflict 
 
1976–92 450,000–1 million Soviet Union, 
Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania, Malawi, 
France, Britain, 
South Africa 
 
Ugandan Civil War 1981–present 100,000–500,000 Britain, Tanzania, 
North Korea, Libya 
 
Second Sudan 
Civil War 
 
1983–present 500,000–1.5 
million 
 
USA, Libya, China, 
Iraq, Iran, Uganda 
 
Somalia Civil War 1988–present 300,000–400,000 USA, Libya, 
Ethiopia, 
UN force 
 
 
Burundi Ethnic 
Conflict 
 
1988–present 100,000+ Rwanda, Zaire 
 
Liberian Civil War 1989–97 200,000+ Sierra Leone, Libya, 
Ivory Coast, 
ECOWAS force 
 
Rwanda Civil War 1990–present 500,000+ Burundi, Zaire, 
Uganda 
 
Sierra Leone 
Civil War 
 
1991–present 100,000+ Liberia, mercenaries 
 
Zaire Civil War 1996–present 200,000+ Rwanda, Burundi, 
Uganda, Zaire 
 
 
Source. Adapted from Copson, Africa’s Wars, pp. 29 and 106, and from original data set in 
Jackson, ―Negotiation versus Mediation.‖ 
 
 
The majority of these wars occurred between 1956 and 1985. This was the period of 
decolonisation and cold war rivalry for the allegiance of Africa‘s new states. The severity of 
many of these conflicts attests to the intensity with which the superpowers and their allies 
competed for influence in Africa.
7
 A more disturbing trend, however, is that nearly a third of 
Africa‘s conflicts have started since 1986, and Africa is experiencing a much greater rate of 
increase in conflicts than other regions. Africa currently has the highest number of ongoing 
conflicts. At present fighting continues in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea, in the Great 
Lakes area (DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda), in Sudan, and in the West African states of 
Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal. In southern Africa, Angola is once again at war, 
and there are emerging conflicts in Lesotho and Namibia. 
 
A complicating factor in Africa‘s conflicts is the high level of outside intervention (see Table 
1). Africa has the highest rate of outside intervention in conflicts—higher even than the 
Middle East, which also experiences a great deal of external interference. For the most part, 
conflicts in other regions more often remain uncomplicated by outside parties. This aspect of 
Africa‘s conflicts, it has been argued, is related to the fact that because African political 
systems ―are internally incoherent and because aspects of their internal form are projections 
of the external environment, they are easily manipulated from the outside.‖8 In other words, 
there is continuity here with the interference by outside powers of the colonial and neo-
colonial periods. 
 
Interestingly, compared to other regions, there has been a relatively low level of UN 
involvement in conflict management in Africa. Most UN attention has been directed towards 
the Middle East, the Far East, and recently, Eastern Europe. This clearly reflects the cold war 
concerns of the great powers in the Security Council and the Eurocentric orientation of the 
United Nations in the post–cold war era. 
 
Turning to the issues in dispute, it is interesting to note that very few of the seventy-nine 
African conflicts were fought over territory or ideology, the issues most often at the heart of 
interstate conflicts. This is surprising in the light of the ―artificiality‖ of African political 
boundaries and the transnational ethnic links that transcend former colonial boundaries,
9
 
which have led to numerous conflicts in the Asian subcontinent, for example. Most conflicts 
in Africa have been independence or secessionist conflicts, and have involved intangible 
elements such as ethnicity, identity, and nationalism. These kinds of issues are the most 
difficult to resolve.
10
 Furthermore, as in the Middle East, African conflicts almost all involve 
multiple issues and are the most complex disputes. High levels of issue complexity also make 
conflict resolution difficult to attain.
11
 
 
In short, conflict management in Africa is fraught with difficulty, and the nature of Africa‘s 
conflicts, combined with external responses, complicates the efforts of diplomats and 
peacemakers to manage them effectively. Added to these disadvantages is the reality that 
without an understanding of which conflict management technique will work best under 
which conditions, and a carefully managed application of conflict management strategies, 
pacific intervention is unlikely to be successful. 
 
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
 
Unfortunately, a review of the scholarly research on international conflict management 
provides few clues for practitioners. A foundational study by Holsti in 1966 found, among 
other things, that negotiation was successful in 47 percent of its attempts, while mediation 
had a 22 percent success rate, multilateral conferences had a 44 percent success rate, referrals 
to international organisations had a 37 percent success rate, and judicial methods had a 45 
percent success rate.
12
 Holsti never pursued the comparative aspects of the study any further 
than the uni-dimensional correlation between conflict management type and outcomes.  
 
A similar study by Northedge and Donelan in 1971 confirmed Holsti‘s results, without 
moving beyond its uni-dimensional correlations of conflict management method and 
outcomes.
13
 However, since then most studies have focused on either negotiation
14
 or 
methods of third party intermediary assistance.
15
 To date, no one has followed Holsti‘s lead 
and examined conflict management in international conflict either comparatively or using 
multiple independent variables. 
 
The empirical problem, then, is formidable: there are no studies to suggest how successful 
different forms of conflict management are likely to be under contrasting conditions of 
international conflict. We simply do not know if mediation is better suited to violent 
intrastate conflicts like the Zairean conflict than negotiation, UN intervention, or multilateral 
conferences, for example. But the problem runs deeper than a dearth of empirical studies. 
There is also a conceptual gap, in that there are few theoretical frameworks for comparing 
different forms of conflict management. 
 
DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
 
The aim of this study therefore, was to attempt to address both the theoretical and empirical 
gaps in current research by developing an appropriate theoretical framework, and then 
applying it in an empirical study that compared negotiation and mediation in international 
conflict. The results would then provide some clues about which form of conflict 
management was more likely to be successful under which conditions. 
 
In this study, I define negotiation as a means of conflict management where the principal 
parties to a conflict of interest communicate directly or indirectly about how they will resolve 
their differences and manage their future relationship.
16
 Mediation, on the other hand, is a 
means of conflict management where the parties to a dispute seek the assistance of, or accept 
an offer of help from, a party not directly involved in the conflict, to resolve their differences 
without invoking the authority of law.
17
 The presence of an outside party not directly 
involved in the dispute, accompanied by an expanded set of communication and coalition 
possibilities, is the key conceptual difference between the two methods. 
 
The theoretical approach developed here to facilitate a comparative study of negotiation and 
mediation is called the Contingency Framework.
18
 This approach, shown diagrammatically in 
Figure 1, is predicated on the notion that conflict management is a social process whose 
outcomes are dependent upon, or contingent on, aspects of the structure and process of the 
conflict. That is, outcomes are determined by the interaction of certain input variables 
mediated through the structure and actual situation of the conflict management. The 
Contingency Approach suggests first that conflict management takes place in three time 
dimensions: (1) antecedent, or past; (2) concurrent, or present; and (3) consequent, or future. 
The antecedent dimension refers to all those inputs and variables which exist prior to 
engaging in conflict management. The concurrent dimension, on the other hand, describes a 
comprehensive range of factors which characterise the conditions and process of a particular 
conflict-management situation, while the consequent dimension draws attention to the 
outcome of the conflict management. 
 
The Contingency Model stipulates three clusters of variables with specific operational 
criteria, each of which may have an impact on the process and outcome of the conflict 
management. The first cluster of variables, contextual variables, refers to aspects of the 
nature of the dispute, the nature of the parties, and their past and ongoing relationship, the 
international context, and in the case of mediation, the nature of the mediator. Here we are 
referring to such factors as the intensity of the conflict, the issues in dispute, the parties‘ 
previous relationship, the intervention of external states, and so on. The cluster of process 
variables refers to activities that take place during the conflict management itself, and to the 
factors immediate to the parties‘ interaction: timing, initiation of the conflict management, 
environment, 
 
Figure 1: A Contingency Framework of International Conflict Management 
 
 
Source: Bercovitch and Langley, ―The Nature of the Dispute,‖ and Jackson, ―Negotiation 
versus Mediation.‖ 
 
 
negotiator identity, and mediator strategies. The final cluster of variables, outcome variables, 
are the dependent variables. The nature of the exercise is, of course, to unravel what effect 
the process and the context have on the success or failure of the conflict management. 
 
THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
The data collection process involved, first, identifying all the armed, or violent, international 
conflicts between 1945 and 1995. Using specific operational criteria, careful research yielded 
a total of 295 conflicts for the period 1945–1995. The second step involved examining each 
of these conflicts for their conflict management efforts. A total of 1,666 discrete cases of 
mediation and 1,154 cases of negotiation were found. Of the 295 conflicts, 225 (or 76 
percent) involved either, or both, negotiation and mediation.  
 
Each discrete case of negotiation or mediation was then coded according to sixty-eight 
variables relating to the context, process, and outcome of the conflict management, as 
specified in the Contingency Model. For example, each case was coded in terms of the issues 
in dispute, the intensity of the conflict, the environment in which it took place, the outcome 
of the conflict, and so on. The data were then subjected to a series of bivariate correlational 
statistical analyses, where the objective was to determine if one or both variables have an 
effect on the distribution of values in the other, or to establish that there is no effect at all. 
 
The process was repeated after isolating the seventy-nine conflicts that occurred in Africa, 
and the 198 cases of negotiation and 506 cases of mediation applied to them. Here the aim 
was to determine whether there were any significant differences between negotiation and 
mediation in African practice compared to negotiation and mediation in international politics 
in general. Significantly, the subset of African cases was not in any way atypical or 
unrepresentative of the global picture. In other words, we can assume that the findings at the 
aggregate level will hold at the lower level, and the lessons learnt about conflict management 
over the international system as a whole can be applied to the African situation. 
 
NEGOTIATION VERSUS MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 
 
The empirical analysis found that it was possible to characterise certain types of conflicts, 
parties, and conflict management interventions that depressed success rates for both 
negotiation and mediation. The data also revealed a profile of those conditions which 
enhanced the likelihood of success. An important finding in the data relates to the 
comparative aspects of negotiation and mediation: overall, negotiation is significantly more 
successful than mediation. Negotiation has an average success rate of 47.0 percent, compared 
to 39.4 percent for mediation. Furthermore, negotiation successes are more durable than 
mediation successes, with 82.0 percent of the agreements lasting more than eight weeks. 
Mediation agreements, on the other hand, lasted more than eight weeks in only 51.7 percent 
of the cases. That negotiation would be more successful than mediation is entirely logical, 
and makes perfect sense theoretically. When two states can sort out their differences 
bilaterally, without interference from any outside parties, they normally will. It is only when 
the level of hostility between the parties is so high that they cannot negotiate face-to-face, or 
they believe they can prevail over their opponent, that mediation becomes necessary. 
 In other words, ―when a conflict is of low intensity or narrow in scope the parties feel they 
can manage nicely by themselves and do not seek assistance from a mediator.‖19 In fact, in 
such circumstances many parties perceive third-party intervention as an unwanted intrusion. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that ―mediation is a weak elixir for improving a dispute 
hostile enough to merit intervention by a third party.‖20 That is, the necessity for mediation 
implies the most difficult conditions for conflict management. It is, thus, logical that 
mediation would be less successful than negotiation. 
 
Interestingly, when only those cases which occurred in African conflicts were examined, it 
was found that both negotiation and mediation were slightly more successful than the average 
success rate. Negotiation had a 51.5 percent success rate in the African context, while 
mediation had a 40.3 percent success rate. Furthermore, negotiation success durability was 
higher than average at 84.2 percent, as was mediation success durability at 58.7 percent. 
 
Significantly, the data showed that little negotiation occurs in Africa (17.2 percent of all 
cases), but nearly a third of all the mediation cases (30.4 percent) occurred in the African 
conflicts. This is reflective of the large number of conflicts in Africa, and particularly, the 
large number of intractable, primarily civil conflicts that are not amenable to traditional 
diplomatic negotiations. On the other hand, it could be argued that, although little negotiation 
takes place in Africa, it is highly successful when it does occur. 
 
In a general sense, this study suggests that negotiation is highly suited to conflicts between 
states that share similar capabilities, political systems, cultures, and alignment. If the conflict 
is narrow in scope and of a low intensity, negotiation will more often produce lasting 
agreements than would mediation. On the other hand, mediation can be usefully applied to 
more complex and intense conflicts, such as those that are currently ongoing in Africa, where 
negotiation is unlikely to occur. However, it will need to be applied early in the fighting, be 
conducted in a neutral environment between high-ranking officials, and most likely employ 
forceful strategies.  
 
Finally, these findings also lend some support to the notion that parties in conflict often go 
through a sequence of conflict management procedures, turning to a new procedure when the 
old ones prove ineffective.
21
 For states, such sequences almost invariably begin with 
negotiation, in the sense of normal diplomatic communications. If this fails, third party 
intermediary assistance may be called for. 
 
ZAIRE REVISITED: A FINAL WORD FOR PRACTITIONERS 
 
A brief return to the Zairean case allows us to get back to the frontier where theory and 
reality interact. Despite the eventual victory for Kabila‘s army in this conflict, the initial 
quandary remains: how should the international community, especially interested parties in 
Africa, have responded to the outbreak of war? Was mediation the only real option, and what 
form should it have taken? Although this study does not allow us to decide once and for all 
the answers to these kinds of questions, it does allow us to make a few general observations 
about how the various conflict management efforts could have been made more successful in 
this case. 
 
In the first place, greater efforts should have been made to encourage bilateral negotiations. 
Initially, it was the Mobutu regime which was unwilling to enter into talks. At this point, 
Western nations, such as France and the United States, which had been staunch allies of the 
regime for the entire cold war era, should have encouraged Mobutu to negotiate, even if they 
had had to exert some diplomatic pressure to do so. While outside intervention into Africa‘s 
conflicts has in the past had a deleterious effect (see Table 1), in recent years those same 
intervening powers have been able to use their influence to bring to an end some of the 
continent‘s worst wars.22 Pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union, for example, 
was partly responsible for the ending of conflicts in Namibia, Mozambique, and Angola. 
Clearly, external states that have long sustained Africa‘s conflicts during the cold war era 
need to take greater responsibility for working to end the continent‘s conflicts in the post–
cold war environment. Pressing for negotiations between Mobutu and Kabila would have 
been an ideal opportunity for such a commitment by France and the United States. 
 
As we have seen from this study, negotiation has a higher rate of durable success than 
mediation, and should always be attempted first. Only if bilateral negotiations fail or cannot 
be initiated should mediation be attempted. 
 
However, the nature of the conflict suggested that negotiation, even if it could have been 
initiated, was unlikely to be successful in any case. The parties had a history of antagonism 
and violence; there were numerous intervening parties—Rwanda, Uganda, Hutu militia; both 
sides were extremely ethnically fragmented; the fighting was intense; and, as one side—
Kabila‘s ADFL—was not a state, there were large differences between the capabilities and 
alignment of the two main parties. Furthermore, as we have seen, there was no real political 
will by either party to settle peacefully. Mobutu‘s regime was unwilling to negotiate seriously 
until it was clear that it was about to lose the entire country. Kabila, on the other hand, was 
willing to talk initially in order to obtain recognition and legitimacy, but as soon as it became 
apparent that the Zairean forces were not going to pose any serious threat to his military 
campaign to take over the entire country, his good will evaporated and he was happy to wait 
for the inevitable collapse of the Mobutu regime. 
 
In short, the best hope for managing this conflict was, in fact, some form of third party 
intervention. In this case, the efforts of the United Nations, the OAU, and President Mandela 
were intuitively correct, even if they were somewhat misapplied. The question remains: what 
kind of mediator and what kinds of mediation would have been most effective? In order to 
answer this question, we need to go beyond the confines of this study for a brief moment. In 
the first place, it seems clear that sending Mohammed Sahnoun as the joint OAU-UN 
mediator was bound to fail. Research has shown that complex conflicts such as this one, with 
such a high degree of hostility, require high-ranking individuals with the ability to wield 
considerable resources and political muscle.
23
 UN representatives like Sahnoun do not 
necessarily possess these vital qualifications. 
 
There is a particular problem here with the efforts of African regional organisations to settle 
conflicts. While regional organisations are generally very successful at resolving conflicts, 
equipped as they are with common ideals, perspectives, and interests,
24
 in Africa they show a 
poor record of success (35.1 percent). This is related to a number of inherent weaknesses, and 
clearly the OAU especially needs major reforms if it is to improve its conflict management 
role.
25
 
 
However, getting the right mediator is only part of the puzzle. Mediation is a contingent 
social behaviour, and what the mediator actually does during the process of conflict 
management is extremely important. This study clearly demonstrates the need to hold the 
mediation in a neutral environment, and to ensure that both parties are represented by equally 
ranked senior officials. Furthermore, in a conflict characterised by intangible issues, high 
fatalities, and major disparities in high power, mediators greatly enhance their chances of 
success if they also employ forceful, directive strategies during the talks, such as making 
threats or promises, imposing deadlines, or suggesting compromise solutions.
26
 Often, only 
powerful states can successfully employ these tactics. In Africa, large states that wish to 
establish themselves as important regional powers, such as South Africa and Nigeria, will 
increasingly have to take on the burden of investing significant resources in the pursuit of 
peace.
27 
Peacemaking by large states from within Africa will be an important part of 
guaranteeing the future stability of the region.  
 
In the end, unfortunately, the mediation efforts in Zaire were too little, too late. In any case, 
the political will necessary to sustain successful conflict management was conspicuously 
absent. A pertinent lesson here is that in the end, successful conflict management is 
dependent upon the conflicting parties themselves. While outside parties can greatly enhance 
the chances of success through careful and prudent manipulation of the site of the talks, the 
timing of the intervention, and the participating officials, ultimately the success or failure of 
the conflict management depends on the willingness of the parties. This is not to say that the 
quest to improve international conflict management is a wasted exercise, only to say that its 
limitations must be clearly recognised. In the complex world of international politics, there is 
no panacea for violent conflicts. Hard work and tireless enthusiasm must characterise the task 
of understanding, explaining, and improving methods of international conflict management. 
Although solving the puzzle of the pacific settlement of international disputes does not 
automatically furnish the political will for such an outcome, the lack of intellectual solutions 
almost certainly precludes it. 
 
APPENDIX 1: LIST OF AFRICAN DISPUTES 
 
01 France–Madagascar: Nationalist Rebellion (Mar. 1947–Aug. 1947) 
02 Eritrea–Ethiopia: Independence Attempt (July 1949–Dec. 1950) 
03 Tunisian Independence (Jan. 1952–Mar. 1956) 
04 Kenya–UK: Mau Mau Revolt (Aug. 1952–Dec. 1963) 
05 Algerian Independence (Nov. 1954–Mar. 1962) 
06 Spain–Morocco: Sahara Conflict (Nov. 1957–Apr. 1958) 
07 Egypt–Sudan: Border Dispute (Feb. 1958) 
08 France–Tunisia: Military Bases Conflict (Feb. 1958–May 1958) 
09 France–Tunisia: Algerian Border Incidents (Feb. 1959–Aug. 1959) 
10 The Congo Conflict (July 1960–mid-1964) 
11 African Territories–Portugal: Independence Struggle (1961–July 1975) 
12 France–Tunisia: Bizerte Conflict (July 1961–Sept. 1961) 
13 Somalia–Kenya; Ethiopia: Somali Expansionism (Nov. 1962–Sept. 1967) 
14 First Sudan Civil War (Sept. 1963–Mar. 1972) 
15 Algeria–Morocco: Tindouf War (Oct. 1963–Feb. 1964) 
16 Somalia–Ethiopia: Ogaden War (Jan. 1964–Mar. 1964) 
17 Rwanda–Burundi: Ethnic Violence (Jan. 1964–Jan. 1965) 
18 France–Gabon: Aubanne‘s Coup (Feb. 1964) 
19 Eritrea–Ethiopia: Secession War (1965–May 1993) 
20 Ghana–Togo: Border Incidents (Jan. 1965–May 1965) 
21 Uganda–Zaire: Border Incidents (Feb. 1965–Mar. 1965) 
22 Chad–Sudan: Intervention and Civil War (Nov. 1965–1972) 
23 Namibian Independence Struggle (1966–Mar. 1990) 
24 Ivory Coast–Guinea: Overthrow Plot (Mar. 1966–Apr. 1966) 
25 Ghana–Guinea: Nkrumah Tensions (Oct. 1966–Nov. 1966) 
26 Zimbabwean Independence Struggle (1967–Jan. 1980) 
27 Guinea–Ivory Coast: Hostage Crisis (Feb. 1967–Sept. 1967) 
28 Nigeria–Biafra: Secession Attempt (July 1967–Jan. 1970) 
29 Zaire–Rwanda: Mercenaries Dispute (Aug. 1967–Apr. 1968) 
30 Guinean Security: Conakry Raids (Nov. 1970) 
31 Uganda–Tanzania: Border Conflict (1971–Oct. 1972) 
32 Equatorial Guinea–Gabon: Corisco Bay Islands (June 1972–Nov. 1972) 
33 Ethiopia–Somalia: Second Ogaden War (mid-1972–1985) 
34 Western Saharan Conflict: Morocco–Mauritania (Oct. 1974–1995) 
35 Mali–Upper Volta (Burkina Faso): Border Conflict (Dec. 1974–June 1975) 
36 Angola–South Africa: Intervention and Civil War (1975–1995) 
37 Zaire–Angola: Border War (Nov. 1975–Feb. 1976) 
38 Mozambique–South Africa: Intervention and Civil War (1976–Oct. 1992) 
39 Uganda–Kenya: Border Incidents (Feb. 1976–Aug. 1976) 
40 Chad–Libya: Aozou Strip and First Chad Civil War (June 1976–June 1982) 
41 Zaire–Angola: Shaba Invasion (Mar. 1977–May 1977) 
42 Second Shaba Invasion (May 1978) 
43 Tanzania–Uganda: Amin Overthrow (Oct. 1978–May 1979) 
44 Algeria–Morocco: Border Conflict (June 1979–Oct. 1979) 
45 Cameroon–Nigeria: Border Incident (May 1981–July 1981) 
46 Ugandan Civil War (Dec. 1981–1995) 
47 Zaire–Zambia: Border Dispute (Feb. 1982–Sept. 1982) 
48 Libya–Chad: Intervention and Civil War (mid-1982–1995) 
49 Ghana–Togo: Border Incidents (Aug. 1982–Oct. 1982) 
50 South Africa–Lesotho: Anti-ANC Raid (Dec. 1982) 
51 Second Sudan Civil War (Jan. 1983–1995) 
52 Liberia–Sierra Leone: Doe Tensions (Feb. 1983–Mar. 1983) 
53 Chad–Nigeria: Lake Chad Conflict (Apr. 1983–July 1983) 
54 Zaire–Zambia: Border Dispute (Sept. 1983–Jan. 1984) 
55 South Africa–Botswana: Anti-ANC Raids (Oct. 1984–May 1986) 
56 Third Shaba Invasion (Nov. 1984) 
57 Fourth Shaba Invasion (June 1985) 
58 Mali–Burkina Faso: Border War (Dec. 1985–Jan. 1986) 
59 Togo Overthrow Attempt (Sept. 1986) 
60 Zaire–Congo: Border Incident (Jan. 1987) 
61 Ethiopia–Somalia: Ogaden Conflict (Feb. 1987–Apr. 1988) 
62 South Africa–Zambia: Anti-ANC Raid (Apr. 1987) 
63 Congo Rebellion (Sept. 1987–July 1988) 
64 Uganda–Kenya: Border Conflict (Dec. 1987) 
65 Somalia Civil War (May 1988–1995) 
66 Hutu–Burundi Conflict (Aug. 1988–1995) 
67 Uganda–Kenya: Border Conflict (Mar. 1989) 
68 Liberian Civil War (Dec. 1989–1995) 
69 Guinea-Bissau–Senegal: Border Conflict (Apr. 1990–May 1990) 
70 Tuareg–Niger Conflict (May 1990–Oct. 1994) 
71 Senegal–Casamance: Secession Struggle (mid-1990–1995) 
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72 Tuareg–Mali Conflict (June 1990–1995) 
73 Rwanda Invasion (Sept. 1990–1995) 
74 Liberia–Sierra Leone: Intervention and Civil War (Mar. 1991–1995) 
75 Djibouti Civil War (Nov. 1991–July 1993) 
76 Egypt–Sudan: Halaib Dispute (Dec. 1992) 
77 Nigeria–Cameroon: Diamond Islands (Dec. 1993–Mar. 1994) 
78 Ghana–Togo: Border Incidents (Jan. 1994–Feb. 1994) 
79 Comoros Coup Attempt (Sept. 1995–Oct. 1995) 
 
NOTES 
 
     An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual Conference of the African 
Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific in Melbourne, Australia, September 1998. 
I am grateful to Chris Rudd for helpful comments and useful suggestions. I also wish to thank 
Allison Houston for assisting my data analysis. 
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